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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN LABOR MARKETS:   
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS 
Michael Murray* 
Several recent filings in labor antitrust cases by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division as amicus curiae have prompted significant 
discussion in the bench, the bar, and the industry.  The Division has ex-
panded its amicus brief program, which has been in place since at least 
1975, in order to further the proper administration of the antitrust laws.  
In the labor space, the Division filed several amicus briefs that detail 
some of its views on the application of antitrust laws to no-poach agree-
ments, that is, agreements among companies about the hiring of each 
other’s employees.  Specifically, the Division has set forth its framework 
for assessing whether such agreements are subject to the per se rule, the 
rule of reason, or so-called “quick look” analysis.  Under the Depart-
ment’s framework, the key questions are whether the entities in the no-
poach agreement are capable of concerted action, whether those entities 
are competitors, whether the entities’ agreement is ancillary to a larger 
arrangement, and whether the agreement merits a “quick look.”  This 
article, adapted from a speech in March 2019, describes the Division’s 
amicus program, provides a brief historical survey of the interaction of 
antitrust and labor law, including enforcement activities, and outlines 
the Division’s approach to no-poach agreements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I am here to talk about the Department of Justice’s antitrust initia-
tives in the labor space.  The Department has been active in this area for 
many years, perhaps most prominently several years ago with a series of 
settlements concerning no-poach agreements and technology compa-
nies.1  I would like to discuss the Department’s current activities, includ-
ing several recent amicus filings that have prompted discussion in the 
bench, the bar, and the industry.  My goal is to set these filings in both 
historical and legal context, to provide a better understanding of the De-
partment’s views in this important area of antitrust practice. 
II. THE DIVISION’S AMICUS PROGRAM 
Before turning to that task, I would like to briefly discuss the related 
initiative that gave rise to those filings.  There have been quite a few 
stories in the press recently about the Department’s renewed focus on its 
amicus program, which consists of the Department’s discretionary fil-
ings in private antitrust cases.2  Commentators are saying that the Anti-
trust Division (“the Division”) is “get[ting] off the sidelines”3 and “seek-
ing to make its voice heard.”4  The reaction to our filings has ranged 
from encouragement to hostility—encouragement from those we are 
supporting and hostility from those we are not supporting.5  It turns out 
 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-5869, Final Judgment, Doc. 66 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 2, 2014); United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1629, Final Judgment, 
Doc. 17 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011); see United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-2220, Final 
Judgment, Doc. 7 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solici-
tation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-re-
quires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee. 
 2. The Antitrust Division’s Competition Advocacy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 28, 
2019),  https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/anti-
trust-division-s-competition-advocacy. 
 3. Bryan Koenig & Matthew Perlman, DOJ Antitrust Division Gets Off the Sidelines, 
LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1126818/doj-antitrust-division-
gets-off-the-sidelines. 
 4. Karen Hoffman Lent & Kenneth Schwartz, Antitrust Division Increasingly Weighs 
In as Amicus Curiae, 261 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Feb. 11, 2019). 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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the age-old adage of “where you stand depends on where you sit” is fully 
applicable to antitrust.6 
This reaction to our amicus program is half accurate.  It is true that 
we are making an active amicus program a priority.  Specifically, as our 
Assistant Attorney General, Makan Delrahim, told Congress, we are try-
ing to expand our amicus program in order to “more proactively and 
more effectively promote the use of antitrust and competition principles 
across the judiciary.”7  To that end, we filed significantly more briefs in 
2018 than 2017 (nine versus one), and if the current rate holds we will 
double that again in 2019, to approximately twenty briefs.8   
But it has been our legal obligation since at least 1975 to file amicus 
briefs as a way to enforce antitrust laws.  In that year, Attorney General 
Levi codified a delegation of authority to the Assistant Attorney General 
of the Antitrust Division.9  The text of it, which still exists today, pro-
vides that several “functions are assigned to and shall be conducted, han-
dled, or supervised by” the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust 
Division and that these functions consist of, among other things, “[g]en-
eral enforcement . . . of the Federal antitrust laws and other laws relating 
to the protection of competition and the prohibition of restraints of trade 
and monopolization, including . . . participation as amicus curiae in pri-
vate antitrust litigation.”10  So although our focus is renewed, it is well-
grounded.  It should be no surprise that we are doing what we are tasked 
to do.   
That the amicus program is discretionary, though, raises a signifi-
cant question: how do we decide which cases to pursue?  The answer is 
that we learn of significant antitrust cases in the same way that scholars 
do:  we search for them in the reporters and the dockets, we read about 
them in the news, and parties and organizations bring them to our atten-
tion.  It is increasingly common for parties and organizations to come to 
us with a pitch about a case that they believe raises significant issues.  
 
 6. This adage is now attributed to a government official from the Bureau of Budget in 
1949. See Rufus Miles, The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 5 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 399 
(1978). 
 7. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney General Makan 
Delrahim Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antirust, Competition Policy and Consumer 
Rights (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-assistant-attorney-general-
makan-delrahim-senate-subcommittee-antitrust-competition. 
 8. Antitrust Division, Appellate Briefs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/appellate-briefs. This count does not include Supreme Court fil-
ings, which are the primary responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor General. See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 0.20(a). There were three Supreme Court amicus cases involving the Division in 2018 and 
one in 2017. 
 9. Revising Delegations of Authority to the Antitrust Division, 40 Fed. Reg. 36118 
(Aug. 19, 1975). 
 10. 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a). 
564 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
That makes a lot of sense, because it is likely that we are already review-
ing the case, and parties reasonably believe that it is useful for them to 
try to persuade us of their view of the case.  In this way, our amicus 
program is becoming somewhat similar to the amicus program of the 
Solicitor General, in which parties routinely advocate in person and in 
writing that the Solicitor General file an amicus brief on their side in the 
Supreme Court.11  This is now a routine part of our practice. 
We sort through these cases in the same way that we sort through 
which affirmative cases to bring in our criminal and civil programs: we 
exercise prosecutorial discretion.  We are guided by the oath that we take 
as federal employees to “support and defend the Constitution” and 
“faithfully discharge the duties of [our] office.”12  And we balance re-
source and policy constraints with the interest of the United States in a 
proper administration of the law.13  Indeed, the very fact that we are more 
active on the amicus front appears to redound to the benefit of the interest 
of the United States: by discouraging private parties from making the 
more extreme versions of their arguments, due to the possibility of a 
contrary United States amicus brief that could undermine their credibil-
ity. 
A review of our filings indicates that we are willing to file on a wide 
variety of topics, from immunities and exemptions to the topic of these 
remarks, labor, to which I will now turn.14 
III. RECENT LABOR AMICUS FILINGS 
We have recently offered several filings to courts considering the 
proper standard for assessing market allocations in a labor market.   
The reactions to our position have been swift and fierce.  The first 
filing, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, took the position that no-
poach agreements among competitors are per se unlawful unless they are 
ancillary to a separate legitimate transaction or collaboration.15  This 
 
 11. Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 6.41 (9th ed. 
2007). 
 12. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331. 
 13. For example, subsequent to filing a Statement of Interest in one no-poach case, the 
Division intervened in the case for the purpose of entering into the settlement with the defend-
ant. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al., 
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 325 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019); Order, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al., 
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 362 (M.D.N.C. May 22, 2019). 
 14. See generally Antitrust Division, Appellate Briefs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/appellate-briefs. 
 15. Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust 
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-798, Doc. 158, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019). Subsequent to the date of 
this speech, the court accepted this argument in In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust 
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-798, 2019 WL 2542241, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019) (accepting Divi-
sion’s argument on per se rule). The Division also filed a similar statement in a different case, 
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position has been characterized by certain defense-friendly lawyers as 
an unsupported assertion based on lawless guidance that creates a 
“trap,”16 but hailed by plaintiff-friendly attorneys as pro-worker plain-
tiff.17  The second filing, in Washington State, explained that no-poach 
agreements in the franchise context are likely subject to the rule of rea-
son.18  This position has been called a “welcome clarification” by de-
fense-friendly lawyers19 but has been criticized by plaintiff-friendly law-
yers as pro-business defendant.20  We have not been able to please all of 
the people all of the time. 
But of course, that is fine with us, because we are not in the business 
of satisfying a particular constituency.  Our Assistant Attorney General 
has promised that “[w]e will be the officious inter-meddlers in random 
cases,” that “[w]e’re not going to take anybody’s side, but the side of 
what we believe . . . the law . . . should be . . . .”21  I am reminded of the 
 
see Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al., No. 
1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 325, at **19-29 (Mar. 7, 2019), and subsequently intervened in that 
case for the purpose of entering into the settlement with the defendant. See Order Granting 
the United States of America’s Unopposed Motion to Intervene, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al., 
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 362 (May 22, 2019). 
 16. James Tierney & Alex Okuliar, DOJ and FTC Set Possible Criminal Liability Trap 
for HR Professionals, ORRICK ANTITRUST WATCH (Oct. 24, 2016), https://blogs.or-
rick.com/antitrust/2016/10/24/doj-and-ftc-set-possible-criminal-liability-trap-for-hr-profes-
sionals/; Reply Brief for Defendants, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 
No. 2:18-mc-798, Doc. 163 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2019). See also Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert 
Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise No-Poach Suits, LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-is-trying-to-rein-in-franchise-
no-poach-suits. 
 17. See Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: 
From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustin-
stitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf; see also 
Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise No-Poach Suits, 
LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-is-
trying-to-rein-in-franchise-no-poach-suits (suggesting that the Department’s position in re-
cent cases is a “welcome clarification” of the law that developed after the 2016 guidance). 
 18. Notice of Intent to File Statement of Interest, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-
cv-00244, Doc. 24 (Jan. 25, 2019). Subsequent to the date of this speech, the parties settled 
these cases. Two courts subsequently considered the issues raised in the Statement. In one 
court, a respected district court judge, who took over for a retired district court judge that 
authored a decision cited in the Statement and this speech, declined to reconsider the retired 
judge’s ruling. See Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 318-CV-00133, 2019 WL 
2754864, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019). In the second court, the district court judge gener-
ally accepted the arguments in the Statement, concluding that rule of reason analysis should 
be applied to the no-poach allegations in that case. See Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, 
Inc. et al., No. 18-12792 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019). 
 19. See, e.g., Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise 
No-Poach Suits, LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/arti-
cles/1130056/doj-is-trying-to-rein-in-franchise-no-poach-suits. 
 20. See Stutz, supra note 17; see also Bershetyn et al., supra note 19. 
 21. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., What’s ahead at the Justice Department?, 
First Annual Conference at the Antitrust Research Foundation at George Mason University: 
What’s ahead in antitrust? (Jan. 19, 2018).  
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famous line from T.S. Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral.  Archbishop 
Thomas Becket is foreseeing his eventual murder for standing on prin-
ciple against the king.  He then is confronted by four tempters who pro-
pose pathways forward.  The first three advise him to do the wrong thing 
to avoid death, but the last urges him to do the right thing, to accept 
death, but not because it is right to stand on principle but rather because 
it would make him famous.  Becket responds that “The last temptation 
is the greatest treason:  To do the right deed for the wrong reason.”22  In 
our amicus program, as our Assistant Attorney General said, we try to 
take the right position for the right reason, not because of the likely re-
action.  In this way, the amicus program parallels the mission of the uni-
versity.  The good faculty member writes articles to advance the truth, 
for the motivation of advancing the truth, and not to be popular, or to get 
tenure, or to be liked by students, or to get on television. 
What all this means is that the best way to understand our position 
in the labor antitrust space is not through a simplistic pro-labor or pro-
business paradigm.  Rather, our position is best understood through the 
lens of the rule of law and as informed by history and doctrine. 
IV. HISTORY: LABOR AND ANTITRUST 
I will first briefly discuss the historical relationship between anti-
trust law and labor markets.  I do this for two reasons: first, it is critical 
to understanding the Department’s position; second, I am not aware of 
any authority—law review, trade publication, or treatise—that provides 
a detailed survey tailored for this purpose. 
The historical relationship between antitrust law and labor markets 
is long and complicated.  It dates at least to the 1890s.  In discussing 
what became the Sherman Act on the floor of the Senate, Senator Sher-
man himself pointed to the power of monopoly to “command[] the price 
of labor.”23  Indeed, Senator Sherman’s Act does not distinguish between 
labor and product markets.24  Subsequently, employers used antitrust law 
to fight labor unionization before the passage of the Clayton Act.25  Then, 
a complex body of statutory and nonstatutory exemptions arose to ad-
dress the intersection of antitrust law and labor markets.26  Over time, 
 
 22. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 22-44 (1935). 
 23. Cong. Rec. 2455, 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 24. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 
F. 994, 996 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893). 
 26. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (statutory exemption); Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (statu-
tory exemption); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (statutory exemption); 
see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-37 (1996) (nonstatutory exemption).   
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antitrust litigation in labor markets has become “rare,”27 at least relative 
to other antitrust litigation.  But that is not because the laws do not ap-
ply.28 
Quite the contrary: federal antitrust enforcers long have been active 
in this space, and in particularly relevant ways for at least the past 
twenty-five years.29  In the early 1990s, the FTC challenged nursing 
homes’ practice of boycotting registries for temporary nursing services 
and the Council of Fashion Designers’ attempt to reduce the fees and 
other terms of compensation for models.30  The United States, for its part, 
sued a Utah society for human resources professionals for sharing wage 
information that caused the matching of wages.31  In 2007, the Depart-
ment also sued an Arizona Hospital Association for setting a uniform 
rate for per diem nurses.32 
And, of course, in this decade, the Department pursued civil en-
forcement actions against several major technology companies that en-
tered into stand-alone (or, in industry parlance, “naked”) no-poach 
agreements regarding their competitors’ employees.33  At that time, sig-
nificantly, the Department alleged that the behavior constituted a per se 
violation.34 
This enforcement focus on the labor markets has become even more 
acute in the past few years.  In October 2016, the Division and the FTC 
issued their Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals.35  
As the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General recently summa-
rized, “[t]he Guidelines cautioned that naked agreements among em-
ployers not to recruit certain employees, or not to compete on employee 
 
 27. Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market 
Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 570 (2018). 
 28. See Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1995); but see Carroll v. 
Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 29. Some private cases also have been litigated; they often involved ancillary restraints.  
See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 
509 (2d Cir. 1999); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981); Nichols 
v. Spencer Int’l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); Union Circulation Co. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 30. See In re Debes Corp., (F.T.C. 1991); see also In re Council of Fashion Designers of 
Am., et al., 120 F.T.C. 817 (1995). 
 31. See generally United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Human Res. Admin., et al., 
No. 94-C-282G, 1994 WL 729931 (D. Utah Sept. 12, 1994). 
 32. See generally United States et al. v. Ariz. Hosp. and Healthcare Ass’n and AZHHA 
Serv. Corp., No. CV07-1030, Doc. 17 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2007). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 
2013); Garrison v. Oracle Corp., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1053-55 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also In 
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 2013); In re 
Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181-84 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 34. See eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
 35. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidance 
for HR Professionals (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download. 
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compensation, are per se illegal and may thereafter be prosecuted crim-
inally.”36   
These Guidelines are notable in many ways.  They are directed to 
HR professionals, which is not our usual target audience for policy pro-
nouncements.  Perhaps as a result, the Guidelines do not really argue for 
their viewpoint: they do not contain case citations or in-depth analysis 
of the law, but rather a few references to previous enforcement actions 
and several broad pronouncements in lay English.  Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly in light of the audience and the message, critics have viewed those 
pronouncements as ambiguous in important respects.  For example, crit-
ics claim that the Guidelines are unclear as to whether settlements among 
companies litigating trade secrets cases are running afoul of the antitrust 
laws.37   
For these reasons and others, the Guidelines remind me of a famous 
Seinfeld episode. Jerry arrives at a car rental agency to rent a car, having 
previously reserved a mid-size.  The clerk tells him that they’re out of 
mid-sizes.  Jerry responds: “But the reservation keeps the car here. 
That’s why you have the reservation.”  The clerk says: “I know why we 
have reservations.”  Jerry replies: “I don’t think you do. If you did, I’d 
have a car. See, you know how to take the reservation, you just don’t 
know how to hold the reservation and that’s really the most important 
part of the reservation, the holding. Anybody can just take them.”38  In 
my view, the Guidelines are like the reservation: anyone can put out 
Guidelines.  The key is making them workable, explaining them, and 
justifying them, so that they can actually guide people. 
The Division’s current leadership has endeavored to do just that.  
About a year ago, Principal Deputy Andrew Finch announced that for 
unlawful per se “agreements that began after the date of th[e] announce-
ment [of the Guidelines], or that began before but continued after that 
announcement, the Division expects to pursue criminal 
 
 36. Acting As’t Att’y Gen. Andrew C. Finch, Antitrust Division, Remarks at Global An-
titrust Enforcement Symposium, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 10 (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-delivers-remarks-global-
antitrust. 
 37. See Karin Johnson & Kevin Cloutier, New Guidance for HR Professionals Regarding 
Wage Fixing and No Poaching Agreements, SHEPPARD MULLIN LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 
2, 2016), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2016/12/articles/antitrust/new-guid-
ance-for-hr-professionals-regarding-wage-fixing-and-no-poaching-agreements-highlights-
new-focus-on-criminal-prosecutions-and-raises-new-concerns-for-employer/. 
 38. See Seinfeld: The Alternate Side (NBC television broadcast Dec. 4, 1991). 
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charges.”39  Around the same time, our Assistant Attorney General ex-
plained that there are pending criminal investigations on this topic.40 
The Department’s first enforcement action, in the case known as 
Wabtec, followed shortly thereafter.41  There, the Department success-
fully sued two of the largest railway producers in the country for agree-
ing not to poach each other’s employees, in the process alleging that the 
defendants’ actions constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.42  
The Department did not pursue criminal charges in that case because the 
agreement did not continue past the date of the announcement of the 
Guidelines. 
Where does that leave us?  I think the following summary is fair: 
the Division has a longstanding enforcement interest in the labor space, 
including the no-poach space, and has taken the position, consistent with 
case law, that naked no poach agreements are per se violations of the 
antitrust laws.   
V. THE DEPARTMENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
That brings me to our recent filings.  This is really a story of, as the 
Deputy Attorney General recently remarked, quoting the Book of Eccle-
siastes, “there is nothing new under the sun.”43  For in light of this his-
tory, it is no surprise that our recent filings have taken the position that 
naked no poach agreements among competitors are per se violations 
while no poach agreements that are not naked or not among competitors 
are subject to the rule of reason.   
But I will spell out the proper thinking about these cases.  I do so 
because the Guidelines lack this detail.  The corresponding caveat is that 
the Division is not so presumptuous to believe that it has all of the 
 
 39. Principal Deputy As’t Att’y Gen. Andrew C. Finch, Antitrust Division, Remarks at 
the Heritage Foundation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5 (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-c-finch-delivers-re-
marks-heritage. 
 40. Matthew Perlman, Delrahim Says Criminal No Poach Cases are in the Works, 
LAW360 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1003788/delrahim-says-criminal-
no-poach-cases-are-in-the-works. 
 41. Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK, Doc. 1, at 
*2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018). 
 42. See generally Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-
00747, Doc. 19 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018); see also Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse 
AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK, Doc. 1, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (“Defendants’ no-poach 
agreements are per se unlawful restraints of trade.”). 
 43. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which 
is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.”); see Dep. Att’y 
Gen. Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Remarks at Wharton School’s Legal Studies and Business Ethics 
Lecture Series, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-wharton-
school-s-legal-studies. 
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answers in this space, but I do believe that these are the right questions 
to ask in a systematic way:44 whether the entities in the no-poach agree-
ment are capable of concerted action, whether those entities are compet-
itors, whether the entities’ agreement is ancillary to a larger arrangement, 
and whether the agreement merits a “quick look.”45 
A. Concerted Action 
The first relevant question is whether the entities that allegedly en-
tered into a no-poach agreement are capable of the “concerted action” 
required by Section 1.46  Copperweld and American Needle provide the 
test to be applied to this question: “The relevant inquiry . . . is whether 
there is a contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy amongst separate 
economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the 
agreement deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decision 
making.”47   
In the typical case, applying these precedents is not a difficult in-
quiry.  Separate, unrelated corporations competing in the market for 
widgets are clearly “independent centers of decision-making.”48  But, in 
other cases, the inquiry can be more complicated because at its core it is 
fact-specific, based on what the Court called “a functional consideration 
of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actu-
ally operate.”49   
For example, in the franchise context, at least one circuit court—
the Ninth Circuit—has held that franchisors and franchisees are a single 
entity exempt from Section 1.50  In that case, the franchisor of Jack-in-
the-Box restaurants required its franchisees to consent to a “no-switch-
ing” agreement, by which franchisees agree not to hire the manager of 
another franchisee’s Jack-in-the-Box within six months of that man-
ager’s termination from the other franchisee’s Jack-in-the-Box without 
the consent of the other Jack-in-the-Box franchisee.51  A manager sued 
 
 44. I do not endeavor to address how these questions should be assessed under Twombly 
and Iqbal at the pleading stage.   
 45. For a similar discussion about the proper questions, see generally expert analysis by 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition issues in labour markets, OECD (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-concerns-in-labour-markets.htm; see in-
fra Section V.B.3. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (applying only to “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy”); see 12 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1402A at 148 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Sherman Act § 
1 reaches ‘concerted action’ . . .”). 
 47. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010) (quoting Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 48. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195 (quoting Copperweld, 560 U.S. at 186). 
 49. Id. at 191. 
 50. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 51. Id. at 447. 
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his franchisee and the franchisor under the Sherman Act.52  The district 
court held, among other things, that the franchisee and franchisor were a 
“common enterprise incapable of conspiring” under the Sherman Act.53  
The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the district court’s extensive 
factual analysis about the degree of control by the franchisor over the 
business of the franchisee—what the district court called the franchisor’s 
exercise of “plenary control” over the franchisee.54 
But that decision—which, importantly, pre-dates American Nee-
dle55—“require[d]” and turned on “an examination of the particular facts 
of [the] case.”56  Indeed, a district court in the same circuit after Ameri-
can Needle reached the opposite conclusion, based on the allegations and 
facts in its case.57  In that case, an employee of the franchisor Cinnabon 
sued Cinnabon and its franchisee for including a no-poach clause in the 
franchise agreement.58  The district court recited the American Needle 
test and then held that the employee sufficiently alleged that the franchi-
sor and franchisee were independent centers of decision making in light 
of the facts.59  The court distinguished the Ninth Circuit case Williams v. 
I.B. Fischer Nevada as turning on its particular facts.60 
In sum, whether separate companies—be they companies in a fran-
chisor/franchisee relationship or another arrangement—are capable of 
concerted action is a complicated question of fact.61 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing Williams v. Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-31 (D. Nev. 1992); Williams, 
794 F. Supp. at 1032 (“This plenary control, in addition to [the franchisor]’s and [franchisee]’s 
common economic goals, make them a single enterprise, incapable of competing for purposes 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
 55. Professor Hovenkamp persuasively argues that this “conclusion is incorrect in light 
of American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).” Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition 
issues in labour markets, OECD (June 5, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/com-
petition-concerns-in-labour-markets.htm. 
 56. I.B. Fischer Nev., at 447. 
 57. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 
18-5627, Doc. 33, at **5-7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (discussed infra).  Other courts have 
not addressed the issue explicitly but have taken as a premise that the entities were separate 
centers of decision making. See also Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 
786, 789 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (proceeding to next step of analysis); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, 
LLC, No. 17-C-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at **4-8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (same, citing 
Copperweld); but see Danforth & Assoc., Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC, No. C10-
1621, 2011 WL 338798, *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2011) (applying Fischer in one sentence of 
analysis without citing American Needle). 
 58. Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627, Doc. 33, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018). 
 59. Id. at 5-6. 
 60. Id. at 6-7. 
 61. That is not to say that this question cannot be addressed on the pleadings under 
Twombly and Iqbal in some cases.   
572 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
B. Standard of Law:  Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason 
Assuming the relevant parties are capable of concerted action, the 
next item on the agenda is determining the proper standard of law—the 
per se rule or the rule of reason.   
1. Competitors 
The next question, consequently, is whether the entities that alleg-
edly entered into a no-poach agreement are competitors in the labor mar-
ket; that is, whether there is a horizontal relationship among them with 
respect to the alleged no-poach agreement.  I emphasize here that com-
panies can be competitors in the labor market but not competitors in 
product or service markets.  Companies in different industries can com-
pete in the same market for employees.  But if they are not competitors 
in the labor market but instead are, for example, vertically related in their 
industry, then any agreement among them is subject to the rule of rea-
son.62  That is black-letter law as a general matter—most recently reaf-
firmed in Amex—and longstanding law in the franchise context as well 
since at least Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.63  Franchisors 
and franchisees, of course, are primarily in a vertical relationship in their 
industry and generally not competitors with respect to the labor market.  
Consequently, agreements among them likely are subject to the rule of 
reason.  Indeed, this conclusion is not particularly controversial: the 
American Antitrust Institute recently proclaimed that no-poach agree-
ments between a franchisor and franchisee are vertical restraints that are 
subject to the rule of reason.64 
 
 62. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018). 
 63. 433 U.S. 36, 54, 59 (1977) (holding that geographical restrictions in franchise system 
are subject to the rule of reason); see Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 64. Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: 
From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustin-
stitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf (“How-
ever, unless the arrangement amounts to a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, an antitrust challenge 
likely would have to be won under the rule of reason, which is notoriously difficult for plain-
tiffs.”). Subsequent to the date of this speech, the American Antitrust Institute sent the Anti-
trust Division a letter purporting to “clarify” its position. See Notice of Supplemental Author-
ity in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Butler v. Jimmy John’s 
Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133, Dkt. No. 87-1 [hereinafter Letter] (S.D. Ill. May 8, 2019) 
(attaching Letter from Diana Moss, President, and Randy Stutz, Vice President of Legal Ad-
vocacy, American Antitrust Institute, to the Hon. Makan Delrahim, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Michael Murray, Dep. Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Divi-
sion, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 2, 2019)). The letter attempts to recast its prior statement as 
part of its legislative advocacy program and as a mere description of “fallacious defense ar-
guments”. See id. at 1-2. But its prior statement simply declares that, with respect to “no-
poaching commitments from franchisees . . . unless the arrangement amounts to a hub-and-
spoke conspiracy, an antitrust challenge likely would have to be won under the rule of reason, 
which is notoriously difficult for plaintiffs.” See Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust 
Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 
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If, however, the entities are not vertically related but rather hori-
zontally related as competitors in the labor market, then they have en-
tered into a classic market allocation.65  As Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. reaffirmed, agreements among competitors to 
divide markets are per se unlawful,66 absent a significant caveat.67  That 
per se rule extends to customer allocation schemes for new or existing 
customers, geographic divisions, and even seemingly small divisions of 
markets.68   
 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-
Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf . Although it may be more expedient to reframe that declara-
tion now that AAI is advocating before courts instead of state legislatures, its prior statement 
makes no mention of or even any allusion to this position being part of “fallacious defense 
arguments.” Letter, at 2. AAI next mischaracterizes the Antitrust Division’s Statement of In-
terest as arguing that courts should “apply the full-blown rule of reason to vertical no-poach-
ing agreements based on the possibility that they could be ancillary to the broader franchise 
agreement” and consequently “ignor[ing] that a restraint could only be removed from the 
quick look category if a court were to ‘conclude’ that the restraint is ancillary,” see Letter at 
2, 3, when in fact the Statement argued just that: “In the latter situation where a court con-
cludes that the no-poach agreement is ancillary, then, by definition, quick look analysis is not 
appropriate.” Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Butler v. Jimmy John’s 
Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133, Dkt. No. 82-5 (“Statement of Interest”), at 17 (E.D. Wa. 
Mar. 7, 2019). Next, the letter criticizes the Statement for relying without citation on the prop-
osition—undisputed in the case in which the Statement was filed—that quick-look analysis 
does not apply to vertical arrangements. Letter, at 6. But the Supreme Court in American 
Express just recently indicated that a “quick look” is inappropriate for vertical arrangements.  
See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. The letter finally turns to what seems to be its primary 
argument, that “the no-poaching agreements at issue have no known, cognizable efficiencies 
and make no economic sense on their fact.” Letter, at 8. Although AAI implies to the contrary, 
the Division’s Statement did not take a position on this factual issue. See generally Statement 
of Interest. Regardless, on this point, several economists responded to the Institute’s letter by 
arguing, in their own letter to the Antitrust Division, that there is “significant evidence that 
low-skilled laborers receive training from employers that can be valuable to the employee,” 
that “no-poaching clauses are consistent with such restrictions,” and that “there is no valid 
evidence that no-poaching clauses in franchise agreements have a significant impact of the 
level of competition for workers in labor markets.” See Letter from Daniel S. Levy, PhD, and 
Timothy J. Tardiff, PhD, Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, to the Hon. Makan 
Delrahim, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Michael Murray, 
Dep. Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (June 11, 2019), 
http://aacg.com/wp-content/uploads/AACG-Letter-to-DoJ-6-11-2019.pdf. 
 65. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Continental TV, 433 U.S. 
at n.28. 
 66. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007); see 
also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam) (explaining that “agree-
ments between competitors to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal”). 
 67. See infra Section V.B.2 (explaining under what circumstances a horizontal restraint 
is not subject to the per se rule).  
 68. See, e.g., Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46, 49-50 (affecting the allocation of customers); 
United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(same); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1088 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(affecting the allocation of territories); United States v. Kemp & Assocs., 907 F.3d 1264, 1277 
(10th Cir. 2018) (explaining that it does not “matter that the alleged agreement would only 
affect a small number of potential customers”). 
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An agreement to allocate employees is no different than one to al-
locate customers: one eliminates competition for employees, another for 
customers.69  As the eBay court puts it, no-poach agreements are “a ‘clas-
sic’ horizontal market division.”70  The leading treatise on antitrust 
law—Herbert Hovenkamp’s Antitrust Law—takes the same position.71 
Competitors, of course, must actually have entered into an agree-
ment, as opposed to merely engaged in parallel conduct.72  Parallel con-
duct arises most often when “competitors adopt[] similar policies around 
the same time in response to similar market conditions.”73  Although it 
“may constitute circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive behavior,” 
“mere parallel conduct is as consistent with agreement among competi-
tors as it is with independent conduct in an interdependent market.”74  
Consequently, some courts “distinguish[] permissible parallel conduct 
from impermissible conspiracy by looking for certain ‘plus factors.’ ” 75   
Gone also are the days when a hub-and-spoke-conspiracy could be 
established without a establishing a rim around the spokes.76  Some ad-
vocates characterized older cases as allowing plaintiffs to establish a sin-
gle conspiracy among competitors (the spokes) subject to the per se rule 
by showing that each competitor (each spoke) separately entered into an 
agreement with a common defendant (the hub).77  Subsequent cases have 
 
 69. United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (ex-
plaining that “[a]ntitrust law does not treat employment markets differently from other mar-
kets” with respect to a classic horizontal market division). 
 70. eBay, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39; see also In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust 
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115 n.9, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. 
Corp., 84 F. App’x 257, 260 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (unpublished per curiam) (suggesting that a 
conspiracy between competitors not to hire each other’s employees could be unlawful per se). 
 71. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2013B at 148 (3d ed. 2012); see also 
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 544 (2018) (“This type of horizontal agreement is a clear violation 
of the Sherman Act.”); see Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated: A Labor Economics 
Justification for No-Poaching Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 284 (2018) (identifying “antipoaching agreements that are 
squarely per se violations”). 
 72. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007); In re Musical Instru-
ments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 73. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1194. 
 76. See id. at 1192-93. 
 77. See, e.g., Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
position attributed by advocate to Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 
459 F.2d 138, 146 (6th Cir.1972)); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 331-
32 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting position attributed by advocate to Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United 
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), and Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th 
Cir. 2000)); see generally In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193 n.3 (“We note, how-
ever, one key difference between a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy (i.e., a collection of 
purely vertical agreements) and a rimmed hub-and-spoke conspiracy (i.e., a collection of ver-
tical agreements joined by horizontal agreements): courts analyze vertical agreements under 
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made clear, however, that such facts do not establish a conspiracy among 
the competitors subject to the per se rule but rather a series of conspira-
cies subject to the rule of reason, unless there are allegations of agree-
ments among the competitors (the rim).78  But, of course, if there is a 
rim, then there is little point in using the hub-and-spoke analogy: that is 
really just a horizontal agreement among competitors that also happens 
to include a non-competitor.79   
2. Ancillarity 
The next question that must be asked concerns the ancillary re-
straints doctrine.  Even a horizontal restraint is not subject to the per se 
rule if it is “subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transac-
tion,” and reasonably necessary to “make the main transaction more ef-
fective in accomplishing its purpose.”80  Whether a particular restraint 
meets this standard depends on the facts of the case.  In one leading case, 
for example, the D.C. Circuit closely analyzed the facts of the interstate 
moving van business to hold that a company’s policy to terminate certain 
moving agents with operations independent of the company was  ancil-
lary to a larger project of organizing an interstate networks of moving 
services.81  Similarly, in a franchise case, the ancillary restraints question 
turns on the relationship between the no-poach agreement and the fran-
chise system, particularly its promotion of inter-brand competition.82  
The answer may not be the same for every franchise system.83  All told, 
then, there are two ways for a no-poach agreement to be subject to the 
rule of reason and not the per se rule: verticality and ancillarity.   
 
the rule of reason,  whereas horizontal agreements are violations per se. This distinction pro-
vides strong incentives for plaintiffs to plead a horizontal conspiracy (either alone or as part 
of a rimmed hub-and-spoke conspiracy). The prospect of establishing a violation per se is 
much more appealing to plaintiffs than the potential difficulty and costliness of proving a § 1 
claim under the rule of reason.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. See, e.g., In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d at 327 (3d Cir. 2010); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d at 203-04 (4th 
Cir. 2002); Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 
F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 2008); see generally 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1402c (3d ed. 2012) (collecting cases). 
 79. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1192 n.3 (“for what is a wheel without a 
rim?”). 
 80. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Bork, J.); see also Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2006) (stating the rule of reason 
applies to joint ventures); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 
1898) (Taft, J.). 
 81. See Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 211, 224. 
 82. Conrad, 2019 WL 2754864, at *1-3; Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. et al., 
No. 18-12792, 630 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019). 
 83. See, e.g., Conrad, 2019 WL 2754864, at *2 (“[I]f the facts of this case show that the 
no-poach agreements are not ancillary restraints, then the DOJ’s theory may not apply.”). 
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3. “Quick Look” 
But a final question still remains: Should such a restraint be ana-
lyzed under the full rule of reason or the quick look doctrine?  The quick 
look doctrine is a rarely-applicable version of the rule of reason analysis 
that is appropriate only when “an observer with even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of economics could conclude that the arrangement in ques-
tion would have an anticompetitive effect.”84  The doctrine recently has 
been criticized,85 and its exact contours have been said to be “lack[ing] 
definition” by Professor Hovenkamp.86  But one thing that is clear is that 
the quick look doctrine is not supposed to be an intermediate third cate-
gory of analysis: it is not some kind of compromise between the per se 
rule and the rule of reason, or invoked whenever a court thinks, for ex-
ample, that a particular restraint is too hard to classify.87  To the extent 
that recent court decisions embody that reasoning, they deserve further 
scrutiny.88 
The foregoing questions are those that should be asked when con-
sidering no-poach agreements.  I have not attempted to answer all these 
questions, even in hypotheticals, because the answers depend on the 
facts, and they vary.  In addition, delving into the particular facts of every 
no-poach case is not in the interest of the United States.  What is in our 
interest is that courts administer the antitrust laws properly with the rigor 
and nuance that the foregoing questions would entail. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have explained that the purpose of our amicus program is to pro-
mote the interest of the United States that courts properly apply the an-
titrust laws.  So we watch cases, taking on the role of tireless advocate 
for the right answer, whether it benefits plaintiffs, defendants, workers, 
 
 84. California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 85. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Anti-
trust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 839 (2016) (“Support for the 
quick look reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the cost of implementing this approach 
and the link between the standard for per se liability and quick look analysis.”); see also Ed-
ward D. Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 67 
(2017) (“The lower courts have been reluctant to embrace quick look analysis. Among plain-
tiffs, only the FTC has actively (and effectively) advocated for the concept of presumptive 
illegality.”). 
 86. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 126 (2018) (“An-
other problem with the so-called quick look is that it lacks definition.”). 
 87. Compare Meese, supra note 85, at 880 (advocating for principled basis for departing 
from rule of reason for quick look), with Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts 
Really “Knaves”?: The Coming Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, 21 ANTITRUST 61, 65 (2007) 
(advocating for quick look as a “compromise”). 
 88. See, e.g., Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797; Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955 at *7-8; 
Order, Yi, No. 18-5627, at *9-10. 
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employers, or others.  I also have explained a nuanced and complex 
framework for the no-poach space, based on the historical relationship 
between the antitrust laws and the labor markets.  We do not have all of 
the answers, but we think these are the right questions: whether the 
agreeing entities can act concertedly, whether they are horizontal com-
petitors, whether their agreement is ancillary to a larger arrangement, 
and whether they merit a quick look. 
This discussion endeavors to both argue and demonstrate that we 
are motivated in both instances by our devotion to the rule of law.  Our 
only job is to see that justice is done. 
